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WHITE HOUSE GETS WEINBERGER STUDY ON ARMS RESPONSE

Officials Say Proposals Would
Breach Unratified '79 Arms.
Accord With Russians

By MICHAEL R. GORDON

Special to The New York Times

WASHINGTON, Jan. 7 — Defense Secretary Caspar W. Weinberger has recommended a number of actions that would conflict with the unratified strategic arms limitation treaty of 1979, Government officials said today.

The recommended actions, which would be in response to Soviet moves purportedly contravening the treaty, have become the focus of a debate over arms control policy.

Mr. Weinberger's recommendations are contained in the second part of a secret report titled "Responding to Soviet Violations Policy Study." Mr. Weinberger submitted the first part to President Reagan before the November summit meeting, along with a letter that was disclosed in the press.

Study Requested by Reagan

The Pentagon study was requested by Mr. Reagan in June when he decided to maintain the policy of not undercutting the 1979 treaty. The pact, signed in Vienna by President Jimmy Carter and Leonid I. Brezhnev, was not ratified, but the United States and the Soviet Union have agreed informally to observe its provisions as long as the other side does.

Officials said that the White House had solicited comments on Mr. Weinberger's study from the State Department, the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and intelligence officials.

The officials said the Administration had stressed to an unusual degree that the study not be publicly disclosed.

The secrecy, the officials said, is intended to minimize the perception that the Government is divided on arms control and to avoid a repetition of the uproar that followed the disclosure of Mr. Weinberger's letter before the summit meeting. The letter urged Mr. Reagan to be firm on arms issues in talks with Mikhail S. Gorbachev, the Soviet leader.

One of Mr. Weinberger's latest recommendations, officials said, is not to dismantle two Poseidon submarines in May when a Trident submarine be-

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gins sea trials.

Unless existing missile launchers are dismantled, the United States will be in conflict with a 1979 treaty limitation on the number of missiles with multiple warheads. One possibility would be to dismantle two Poseidon submarines.

But, instead of dismantling, the Defense Secretary suggested that the submarines be simply retired in such a way that they could be easily reactivated, officials said.

Although no deadline is given for acting on these and other recommendations, officials said, the issue of continued adherence to the 1979 treaty limits must evidently be decided before May.

Mr. Weinberger also recommended replacing some single-warhead Minuteman 2 missiles with Minuteman 3 missiles, which carry three warheads. The United States would thus add multiple-warhead missiles, further exceeding the treaty limit.

In addition to 550 Minuteman 3 missiles that are deployed, the United States has about 60 other such missiles that could be deployed, officials said. They said that the missiles were bought under President Gerald R. Ford when it was decided not to extend the Minuteman 3 production line.

According to the officials, Mr. Weinberger has also suggested that the United States encode signals sent by missiles during tests to deny the Soviet Union information about the tests.

Such a step would be taken in response to the Soviet practice of encoding test signals. The 1979 treaty allows some encoding, but the United States contends that the Soviet Union has been exceeding treaty provisions intended to allow verification of compliance through monitoring.

A further recommendation involves stepping up research on biological and chemical weapons, officials said.

Mr. Weinberger's report does not say whether his proposals have been endorsed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, officials said. The military is known to be concerned that some of the recommended responses could divert funds from nonnuclear weapon programs.

In the November letter to Mr. Reagan, Mr. Weinberger said the Joint Chiefs took the position that putting strategic programs into effect as originally proposed by the Government would be the "appropriate and proportionate" response to purported Soviet moves if the programs were fully financed by the Congress. Except for the MX missile, most of the programs have had Congressional support.

Some Government officials have

criticized Mr. Weinberger's recommendations on the ground that they seem intended to have the United States abandon the 1979 treaty and that the military logic behind some of the responses is not compelling.

These officials say there are steps that could be taken to hedge against possible military risks posed by purported Soviet actions, without coming into conflict with existing treaties. The officials suggest spending more on decoys that are carried by ballistic missiles to foil possible Soviet defenses. They are also said to recommend spending more on bombers.

The United States contends that the Soviet Union may be working on a national missile defense system, though it acknowledges that much of the evi-

dence is inconclusive.

Those who support Mr. Weinberger's recommendations say they are needed to show that the United States will react strongly to the purported Soviet moves considered contrary to arms accords.

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OPINION

BY JACK KEMP

Sending Russia a Treaty RSVP in Response to Arms Violations

Twice now the president has reported to Congress on numerous Soviet violations of arms control agreements. He has also released an unclassified summary of the report by his General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament detailing a systematic pattern of Soviet arms control violations. Ronald Reagan is the first president in history to make this information available to the public, despite the fact that a number of these violations have been known to the U.S. government for many years. But what has been missing to date is the policy guidance on what to do about these violations.

That void should soon be filled. By presidential directive, the Defense Department is in the midst of drafting the second half of a report on recommended responses to Soviet arms control violations (known as the RSVP report: Responses to Soviet Violations Policy). Part one of that report, assessing the policy implications of Soviet violations, was delivered to the president on the eve of his departure for Geneva.

In his covering letter, Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger cautioned against reaching any agreement at the summit that would limit our ability to take steps necessary to compensate for Soviet arms control violations. In particular, any restrictions on the testing and development of our strategic defenses, or any agreement to continue to abide by the limits of the unratified SALT II treaty, would run the risk of preempting

necessary military responses to Soviet violations.

True to the president's stated purpose, no premature agreements emerged from the Geneva meeting. But there is a serious question whether the impending recommendations from the Defense Department will fully meet the challenge of responding to Soviet arms control violations, or whether those recommendations will be tempered by the interagency process so as not to temper the postsummit mood.

Despite repeated public exposés and private demarches (including at the summit meeting), the Soviets have adamantly refused even to acknowledge their treaty violations, let alone correct them. In prior

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ARMS VIOLATIONS...CONTINUED

years, Soviet noncompliance was "resolved by accepting what has been done in violation," according to Paul Nitze, the president's senior arms control adviser. For our part, we have learned that inaction begets more violations, a worsening strategic balance and declining prospects for real achievements through arms control.

For it has become increasingly clear that the Soviet violations are far from negligible. They go to the heart of agreements that bear directly upon our nation's security. As a result, the Soviet threat has grown beyond limits imposed by arms control agreements, in ways unanticipated by our policymakers.

Accordingly, in mandating the Defense Department study, the president cautioned that "we cannot impose upon ourselves a double standard that amounts to unilateral treaty compliance and, in effect, unilateral disarmament." Instead, we need to take steps to deny the military benefit of violations to the Soviet Union, to provide incentives to the Soviets to correct their violations and to help hedge against the military consequences of continuing Soviet violations.

Possible responses to Soviet arms control violations fall roughly into two categories: (1) what new defense programs should be adopted or what ongoing programs should be modified, and (2) what should our policy be toward observing arms control agreements that we know the Soviets are violating.

On the military side, many responses are available to us, ranging from the relatively inexpensive or cost-free (such as maintaining Poseidon submarines in service and deploying Minuteman III missiles in warehouses) to economically efficient (such as continuing the production of the B-1B bomber line and accelerating the antisatellite and Strategic Defense Initiative programs) to the very innovative (such as deploying cruise missiles in South Korea). The purpose of the RSVP study is to spell these options out in detail.

But we cannot expect to implement effective military responses without paying for them. During the initial years of the Reagan presidency, the Congress acted as a partner in restoring our defenses. Due in no small part to our strengthened defenses,

the president was able to appear before a joint session of Congress upon his return from Geneva and report positively on his meeting with Mikhail Gorbachev. That partnership must be maintained if we are to offset the negative implications for our national security of Soviet arms control violations and sustain the advances we have achieved to date.

We must decide whether to continue to observe agreements the Soviets are violating. The most immediate case in point is the SALT II agreement. By its terms, SALT II expires at the end of this year. Our current interim restraint policy was based upon the president's desire to "go the extra mile," pursuant to which we cut up a Poseidon submarine (in addition to the eight Polaris submarines that have already been dismantled) in order to comply with launcher limits, in hopes that the Soviets would be forthcoming in bringing their behavior into conformity with the treaty. Yet, having gone the extra mile, we are no closer to resolving Soviet noncompliance. We are simply out one ballistic submarine, with two more marked for dismantling next year, while Soviet strategic preponderance continues to grow.

In view of continued Soviet noncompliance, I believe that the interim restraint policy has outlived its useful life and should be set aside in favor of a more constructive arms control policy. The Soviets will never have any incentive to negotiate stabilizing and equitable agreements if the leftover, unratified, old arms control regime continues to give them an advantage. Nor will they have any incentive to correct their violations, if our compliance is unilateral and unaffected by their violations.

Some have said that, whatever else we may do in response to Soviet violations, we should continue the interim restraint policy because without SALT II the Soviets could "break out." I do not find this argument very convincing. First, the Soviets would be hard-pressed to engage in any major increase in force expansion: They're already expanding at a peak rate. Second, their record of violations indicates that they've never felt especially constrained by arms control agreements that conflict with their force requirements. Finally, a far more serious problem for our national security

arises if we continue to be constrained by the limits of an agreement that the Soviets feel free to violate: the double standard the president has called unilateral disarmament.

President Reagan has established a new benchmark for informing the American people of key developments that affect our national security. In addition to his precedent-setting disclosures of Soviet arms control violations, the president has released yearly Soviet military power publications that represent the first effort to report in a straightforward, comprehensive way the extent of the Soviet military buildup; State Department "White Papers" that provide extensive documentation of vast Soviet supply networks into Central America, the Caribbean and the Middle East; physical and photographic evidence of the use of chemical and bacteriological agents in Afghanistan and Southeast Asia; an unprecedented, unclassified version of the current National Intelligence Estimate constituting the most highly sensitive intelligence information available to our government on the Soviet threat; a comprehensive report on Soviet efforts to acquire militarily significant Western technology, exceeding in scope and resources anything previously imagined; and most recently, a joint Defense/State department report on Soviet strategic defense initiatives that documents a Soviet SDI effort far beyond that demonstrated by the United States.

In short, the Reagan administration has declassified more sensitive intelligence information than all previous administrations, convinced that the public has the right to be informed of what we're up against. Not the least of these is the record of Soviet noncompliance.

But as Karl von Clausewitz observed, "Truth, in itself, is rarely sufficient to make men act. Hence the step is always long from cognition to volition, from knowledge to ability." In addressing Soviet arms control violations, we are poised to take that long step.

The upcoming RSVP report, and congressional willingness to respond to Soviet violations, will determine to a large extent whether our arms control policy will be defined by transitory atmospherics or by the reality of a Soviet military buildup in contravention of their arms control obligations and may well mark the difference between faltering and moving forward to a more secure and peaceful future.

Kemp, a Republican, is the U.S. representative from the 31st District of New York.

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